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Previous research has shown that motor experience of an action can facilitate the visual
recognition of that action, even in the absence of visual experience. We conducted
an experiment in which participants were presented point-light displays of dance-like
actions that had been recorded with the same group of participants during a previous
session. The stimuli had been produced with the participant in such a way that each
participant experienced a subset of phrases only as observer, learnt two phrases from
observation, and created one phrase while blindfolded. The clips presented in the
recognition task showed movements that were either unfamiliar, only visually familiar,
familiar from observational learning and execution, or self-created while blind-folded
(and hence not visually familiar). Participants assigned all types of movements correctly
to the respective categories, showing that all three ways of experiencing the movement
(observed, learnt through observation and practice, and created blindfolded) resulted
in an encoding that was adequate for recognition. Observed movements showed the
lowest level of recognition accuracy, whereas the accuracy of assigning blindfolded self-
created movements was on the same level as for unfamiliar and learnt movements.
Self-recognition was modulated by action recognition, as participants were more likely to
identify themselves as the actor in clips they had assigned to the category “created” than
in clips they had assigned to the category “learnt,” supporting the idea of an influence
of agency on self-recognition.
Keywords: action recognition, self-recognition, motor learning, point-light walker, dance-like actions
INTRODUCTION
Human body motion has been studied by many authors using point-light displays in which only
white dots on a black background indicate relevant parts (joints) of a moving body (Johansson,
1973). Such displays are used as stimuli that contain only movement information without any
additional information about the person (see Thornton, 2006; Blake and Shiffrar, 2007). Studies
using point-light walkers have shown that the moving dots representing a body in motion reliably
convey information about the person’s familiarity (Cutting and Kozlowski, 1977; Troje et al., 2005),
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gender (Kozlowski and Cutting, 1977; Pollick et al., 2005), and
emotional state (Dittrich et al., 1996; Atkinson et al., 2004).
Fewer studies focused directly on identifying the type of action
performed (Dittrich, 1993), however, studies in which point light
displays representing different types of action were compared and
showed that actions differ with regards to the information they
reveal about the actor’s identity (Loula et al., 2005; Sevdalis and
Keller, 2009). Recent literature suggests that body motion (e.g.,
gait) in general contributes significantly to person recognition
in real-world scenarios, in particular from a distance or in
uncertain viewing conditions, whereas from close-up, the face is
the primary cue for recognition (Rice et al., 2013; Hahn et al.,
2015). Yovel and O’Toole (2016) provide a framework explaining
person recognition in the real world, suggesting that dynamic
information, in the form of dynamic identity signatures, plays
the central role in binding together information from face, body,
and voice into a multi-modal dynamic representation of a person,
and that this binding function is the main contribution of the
superior temporal sulcus to social cognition. Taken together,
these studies corroborate that body motion plays a crucial role
in person recognition and that the type of action as well as the
action context interacts with this process.
Comparing different types of actions represented as point-
light displays, Sevdalis and Keller (2009) found that free
dancing resulted in better self-recognition from point-light
displays compared to walking and clapping, and suggested that
this finding was based on the more pronounced “kinematic
fingerprint” of the improvised dance movement compared
to other actions. Dance movements often do not involve
interactions with objects or persons and have no obvious external
goal that can be referred to with respect to its anticipated
outcome (e.g., Prinz, 1997; Hommel et al., 2001). Instead, dance
movements typically possess internal goals that are related to
the movement itself, its trajectory, dynamics, and expression.
Schachner and Carey (2013) refer to actions that do not have
obvious external goals as “dance-like,” even if these actions are
not performed in a dance context. The authors showed that
observers tended to interpret actions as intentionally movement-
related (and thereby “dance-like”) if they were not able to infer
external goals from observing the actions, or if the actions seemed
inefficient or inappropriate with respect to any potential external
goal. In dance training, movement learning is most commonly
practiced by observation of a human model, and observational
learning has proved to be the most successful learning mode
(Schmidt, 1975, 2003; Blandin and Proteau, 2000; Hodges et al.,
2007). Performing movement with closed eyes, however, is
considered a meaningful practice in modern and contemporary
dance training, as it provides an unusual experience with
enhanced perception of kinesthetic, proprioceptive, haptic, and
acoustic information. In this study, our aim was to apply
the movement-based approach to action and actor recognition
provided by the use of point-light displays to dance-like actions
that had been acquired in the absence of visual feedback.
Casile and Giese (2006) showed that motor experience of
an action (walking) can facilitate the visual recognition of that
action, even in the absence of observational learning or visual
experience. In their study, they applied a learning paradigm based
on verbal and haptic feedback to dissociate visual and motor
learning of unusual gait patterns. The results showed that visual
recognition of the non-visually learnt material was improved
compared to similar but untrained movement material and that
recognition performance correlated with the ability to perform
the learnt movement. The authors concluded that non-visual
motor learning has a direct influence on visual action recognition.
Our aim was to extend the findings by Casile and Giese
(2006) to non-cyclic full-body movements other than gait
patterns. Additionally, in order to make sure that movement
representations were based solely on proprioceptive and
kinaesthetic feedback, we used motor actions that were not learnt
through haptic guidance or verbal instruction, but created by
the participants themselves in the absence of vision. In our
study, we investigated to what extent participants were able to
recognize movements they had created and performed while they
were blindfolded from visual observation of point-light displays.
Visual recognition performance of these blindfolded self-created
movements was compared to that of learnt (via observation
and movement practice) and only observed (without physically
moving along) movements, and to unfamiliar movements as
control. We expected that the “blind-created” movements could
be recognized successfully from visual observation equally well as
movements that had been learnt from observation and imitation,
based on the multimodal nature of the action representation
built up during the creation and execution of the movement.
Furthermore, based on previous studies (e.g., Loula et al., 2005;
Sevdalis and Keller, 2009), we expected that participants would be
able to distinguish between themselves and others as performers
of the action equally well for actions they had learnt from
observation and actions they had created while being blindfolded.
The ability to differentiate between oneself and others on the basis
of visual and acoustic action information has been investigated
by many authors [see Knoblich and Flach (2003) for review],
and rich evidence exists that dynamic visual cues (such as those
provided by point-light displays) are particularly well suited for
self-recognition (e.g., Troje et al., 2005). Self-other discrimination
from sound information representing complex motor actions has
also been studied in the absence of visual information for sports
(e.g., Murgia et al., 2012; Kennel et al., 2014) and musical contexts
(see Sevdalis and Keller, 2014). These findings support the view
that action representations stored in memory are based on
motor execution and practice, and thereby include individualized
information deriving from the performer‘s motor system that can
be accessed through different modalities (Flach et al., 2004; Repp
and Knoblich, 2004; Repp and Keller, 2010).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Nineteen sports students (22–26 years of age, mean 23.4 years;
all right handed, four males) participated in this study.
Seven out of the 19 students practiced dance or gymnastics
regularly, 9 trained ball games (mostly soccer and volleyball),
others most practiced sports included tennis, running, and
fitness training. All students took part in the same seminar,
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participation in the experiment was recommended for their
own experience but was not necessary for course credit.
The students were not informed about the purpose of
the movement recording session before taking part in the
following point-light experiment. This study was carried out in
accordance with the recommendations of the ethics committee
of Bielefeld University. A prospective ethics approval was
not required in agreement with the institutional institution’s
guidelines and national regulations. All subjects gave written
informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki.
Procedure
The procedure consisted of two sessions, a movement recording
session and a recognition session. During the first session,
movement phrases were recorded with groups of students in
the biomechanics lab using Vicon motion capture to produce
point-light displays as stimuli for the following action recognition
experiment. In the second session, each student participated
individually in the action recognition experiment. The first
session took place on the same day for all participants;
the second session was conducted 14–21 days after the first
session.
Action Recording Session
For the first session, students were randomly assigned to
six groups of three (in one case four). Two groups entered
the biomechanics lab together for a recording session of
approximately 1 h, resulting in three recording sessions for all
19 participants. The recording session with two groups took
place in the following way: After entering the biomechanics
lab, one group was defined by the experimenter as “observers”
and instructed to sit on the side of the lab watching the
other group attentively and quietly, without moving themselves.
The other group was defined as “active group,” and each
member of this group were equipped with 15 retro-reflective
markers positioned the body (one on each foot, knee, hip,
hand, elbow, shoulder; two on the forehead; and one on the
sternum). Subsequently, one member of the active group was
blindfolded with a sleeping mask, and was lead to the middle
of the recording space (approximately 2 × 2 m). The two
other members of the active group were standing outside the
recording space, with sufficient space around them to move freely
and to watch their blindfolded group member. The blindfolded
participant was then instructed to start moving and create a
short movement phrase that s/he considered novel and unusual,
and to repeat it until s/he felt confident (creating movement
blindfolded had been tried out in the seminar once before, so
this practice was not entirely new to the students, but they had
not been informed that this would be done during the movement
recording session). The two other students were instructed to
watch the “movement designer” and to learn the movement
by imitating or marking. After the two partners indicated that
they felt confident performing the movement, each member of
the group was recorded performing the movement individually
three to five times using the Vicon motion capture system. The
“movement designer” remained blindfolded throughout until the
recording of “his/her” movement with all partners was finished,
whereas the “learners” were performing with their eyes open.
After the recording of this particular movement, the blindfold
was removed from the “movement designer’s” eyes and one
of the partners (“learners”) was assigned the new “movement
designer.” The procedure was repeated for each member of the
“active” group so that everyone took the role of the blindfolded
movement designer once, and each member of the active group
was recorded performing his/her own and every other member’s
movement. Subsequently, the active group and the group of
observers swapped roles, the observers were seated on the side
of the lab, and the whole procedure was repeated with the new
active group.
Recognition Task
The Vicon recordings were transformed into 2D video clips,
with all movements being shown from the same distance and
perspective (designated front view). Short clips each containing
one full performance of each movement were cut from the
footage to produce the stimulus material for the movement
recognition task. For stimulus presentation, Presentation R©
software (14.8) was used. During the experiment, 36 movements
were shown once in randomized order. Each movement clip was
preceded by a screen with the text “Movement no. x” (with x
being the number of the presented clip, counting from 1 to 36) for
2000 ms, a black screen (500 ms) and a fixation cross (500 ms),
and followed by a black response screen during which the
stimulus presentation was paused. To continue the experiment
(with presentation of the next stimulus), the participant had to
press the space bar. Each participant was presented 36 video
clips showing 12 different movements, each performed by three
different persons (one “movement designer” and two “learners”).
Six of the movements (18 clips) were familiar (i.e., recorded
during the session the participant had taken part in) and six
were unfamiliar (recorded during sessions with other groups).
For half of the familiar movements (nine clips), the participant
had been observer, whereas the other half had been recorded
with him/her being “active” (i.e., the participant had performed
these movements him/herself, two sighted as learner and one
blindfolded).
Each participant performed the movement recognition task
individually in a quiet laboratory. The student was instructed to
sit in front of the computer screen and watch the displayed point-
light clips, and to mark the responses in a paper questionnaire
with a pen. After each movement clip, when the stimulus
presentation was paused, the participant had to answer two
questions by ticking the appropriate boxes, and subsequently
to press the space bar to activate the presentation of the next
stimulus. The questions that had to be answered for each point-
light clip during the experiment (originally in German) were the
following:
Question 1: I have ..
• neither watched nor performed this movement;
• only watched this movement, as observer;
• watched, learnt, and performed this movement;
• created and performed, but not watched this movement.
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Question 2: The person in the video clip ..
• was me;
• was not me;
Statistical Analysis
The results are presented with descriptive table and comparisons
between rates of answers between categories unadjusted for
the dependence of answers made by the same participants are
obtained with chi-squared tests. Analyses accounting for multiple
responses from the same participants were done using multilevel
logistic regression. All analyses were performed using Stata
(StataCorp., 2015, Stata Statistical Software: Release 14, College
Station, TX, United States: StataCorp LP.).
RESULTS
Action Recognition
Answers to Question 1 (action recognition) were categorized
into correct answers (i.e., clips correctly assigned to one of
the four categories: unfamiliar, observed, learnt, or self-created)
and incorrect answers (clips incorrectly assigned). Numbers of
answers given for Q1 are displayed in Table 1. The distribution
of true and false positives per action category answered and
of correct answers per action category are provided unadjusted
(Tables 2, 3) as well as adjusted for multiple responses (Table 4).
The unadjusted comparison of the distribution of true
and false positive per answer categories (Table 2) showed
a significant difference. The adjusted comparison (multilevel
logistic regression) showed that the odds of a true positive
when answering “observed” is 77% lower [OR: 0.23; 95% CI:
(0.07, 0.81); p = 0.02] than the odds of a true positive when
answering “created.” The odds of true positives for the answer
categories “unknown” and “learnt” did not significantly differ
from the answer category “created” (Table 4). With respect to our
hypothesis, that means that participants indeed recognized and
categorized the actions they had created while blindfolded equally
well as actions they had learnt from observation and unfamiliar
actions they had neither watched nor performed, whereas they
were less successful in recognizing actions they had only observed
but not performed themselves.
The distribution of correct answers per scenario categories
depends significantly on the category (p-value for chi-squared
test: 0.01 for Table 3). However, the adjusted comparison
(multilevel logistic regression) showed no significant difference
in the odds giving a correct answer for any type of action category
compared to the “created” action category situation (see Table 4,
Model 2).
Actor Recognition
Answers to Question 2 (actor recognition) were categorized into
correct answers (i.e., clips correctly identified as showing oneself
or not showing oneself) and incorrect answers (clips incorrectly
identified). Numbers of answers given for Q2 are displayed in
Table 5.
Identification of the actor as oneself or not oneself in this
task was only meaningful for actions that the participant had
performed him- or herself. The next important step therefore is
TABLE 1 | Numbers of participants’ answers given for each action category.
Action category
Answer given
Unknown Observed Learnt Created Sum
“Unknown” 318 24 5 5 352
“Observed” 21 141 11 2 175
“Learnt” 3 6 95 1 105
“Created” 0 0 3 49 52
Sum 342 171 114 57 684
TABLE 2 | True and false positives per action category answered.
Answer category Unknown Observed Learnt Created
True positives (N, % of answers) 318 (90%) 141 (81%) 95 (90%) 49 (94%)
False positives (N, % of answers) 34 (10%) 34 (19%) 10 (10%) 3 (6%)
Total answer 352 175 105 52
TABLE 3 | Correct answer per action category.
True action category Created Unknown Observed Learnt
Correct answers (N, % of total) 49 (85%) 318 (92%) 141 (82%) 95 (83%)
Total number of actions 57 342 171 114
TABLE 4 | Results of the multilevel logistic regression.
Odds ratio 95% CI p-value
Model 1 True/false positives
Answer category
Created (reference)
Unknown 0.58 [0.17, 1.98] 0.38
Observed 0.23 [0.07, 0.81] 0.02
Learnt 0.55 [0.14, 2.15] 0.39
Model 2 Correct/false answer
Action category
Created (reference)
Unknown 2.21 [0.92, 5.51] 0.07
Observed 0.75 [0.31, 1.80] 0.53
Learnt 0.80 [0.32, 2.01] 0.65
TABLE 5 | Numbers of participants’ answers given for identification of the actor as
self or non-self.
Actor category Self Non-self Sum
Answer given
“Self” 22 (38.6%) 20 (3.2%) 42
“Non-self” 34 (59.7%) 600 (95.7%) 634
No answer 1 (1.8%) 7 (1.1%) 8
Sum 57 (100%) 627 (100%) 684
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 October 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1909
fpsyg-09-01909 October 13, 2018 Time: 11:59 # 5
Bläsing and Sauzet Recognition of Self-Created Unfamiliar Actions
to analyze the results for Question 2 with regards to those for
Question 1. This is especially important as participants’ answers
to the two questions were not independent of each other, but
were given successively for each clip, both in the same trial.
When relating self-recognition to action recognition, a difference
has to be made between self-recognition with respect to actions
the participant had (correctly or incorrectly) assigned to the
categories “learnt” or “created” (Table 6), and self-recognition
with respect to actions that indeed belonged to these categories
(Table 7). Therefore, in the following, we will differentiate
between these two scenarios.
Given that the answer to the first question was “learnt” or
“created,” the odds of self-recognition was 75% [OR: 0.24, 95% CI
(0.11,0.52)] lower for those answering “learnt” compared to those
answering “created.” Reducing the comparison to the questions
for which “self ” was true (50 answers for 19 participants) the
odds of self-recognition was 98% [OR: 0.02, 95% CI (0.00, 0.56)]
lower for those answering “learnt” compared to those answering
“created.” Reducing the comparison to the questions for which
“self ” was not true (107 answers for 19 participants) the odds of
self-recognition was 65% [OR: 0.34, 95% CI (0.12, 0.98)] lower for
those answering “learnt” compared to those answering “created.”
This means that participants were more likely to recognize
themselves as actors (correctly or not) in clips they had assigned
to the category “created” than those they had assigned to the
category “learnt.” This effect was much stronger in the situation
were self was actually true.
DISCUSSION
In a study with participants who had only basic dance experience,
we were interested in the participants’ ability to recognize
TABLE 6 | Numbers of participants’ answers given for identification of the actor as
self or non-self for action categories categorized as “created” or “learnt.”
Action category Created Learnt Sum
Answer given
“Self” 23 (44%) 14 (13%) 37 (24%)
“Non-self” 29 (56%) 88 (84%) 117 (74%)
No answer 0 3 (3%) 3 (2%)
Sum 52 (100%) 105 (100%) 157 (100%)
TABLE 7 | Numbers of participants’ answers given for identification of the actor as
self or non-self for action categories answered “created” or “learnt” separately for
self true and not true.
Self is true Not self is true
Action category Created Learnt Created Learnt
Answer given
“Self” 14 (70%) 7 (23%) 9 (28%) 7 (9%)
“Non-self” 6 (30%) 22 (73%) 23 (72%) 66 (88%)
No answer 0 1 (3%) 0 2 (3%)
Sum 20 (100%) 30 (100%) 32 (100%) 75 (100%)
movement phrases they had experienced through learning
from observation and practice, from pure observation, or
from improvisation without vision while being blindfolded. We
presented our participants with 36 video-clips showing point-
light displays of dance-like actions that had been recorded with
the same participants during a previous session. The clips showed
dance-like movements of four categories: unfamiliar, observed
(but not performed), learnt (observed and performed), and
self-created while blindfolded (performed, but not observed).
Based on previous studies (e.g., Casile and Giese, 2006), we
expected that participants would be able to assign the presented
movement phrases to the correct categories, independent of the
modality of their specific previous experience of that action
(visual, kinaesthetic, both, or none); in particular, we expected the
recognition accuracy for the blindfolded self-created movement
phrases to be on the same level as for the other categories.
Results showed that participants assigned movements of all four
categories correctly to the respective categories, showing that
all three ways of experiencing the movement (observed, learnt,
created blindfolded) resulted in an encoding of the movement in
long-term memory that was sufficient for recognition (Schmidt,
1975, 2003). Observed movements showed the lowest level
of recognition accuracy, whereas the accuracy of assigning
blindfolded self-created movements was on the same level as for
unfamiliar and learnt movements.
As main finding of this study, the recognition of point-light
displays from movements that the participants had created and
performed, but never visually experienced, was equally high
as for the movements they had learnt through observation
and practice, and higher than for the movements they had
only observed. This finding corroborates results of a previous
study in which participants learnt gait patterns without visual
feedback, based only on haptic and verbal cues (Casile and
Giese, 2006). The performance of the participants in assigning
the visually displayed movements correctly points toward a
perceptual equivalence of movements learnt from observation
and those created blind-folded during the recording session,
as both could be accessed via visual observation of the point-
light display equally well. These findings support the idea
of an intermodal mapping of kinesthetic and proprioceptive
movement representations to the visual domain (Schütz-Bosbach
and Prinz, 2007).
According to recent approaches, motor learning and
execution is based on the integration of visual, auditory, verbal,
proprioceptive, and kinaesthetic information into a holistic
multimodal mental representation of the learnt action in
long-term memory (Zacks et al., 2007; Barsalou, 2008). Such
representations are supposed to comprise declarative and
non-declarative memory content that is integrated and updated
with every new access and are therefore thought to underlie
the physical execution as well as the mental imagery of a motor
action, with their internal structure depending on the quality of
performance (Land et al., 2013). Nomikou et al. (2016) argue in
favor of rich multimodal representations continuously developed
through and for action and interaction, suggesting that such
representations are built early during development by acting and
interacting in the physical and social world. Such representations
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have to be dynamic in nature to capture temporal progression
and allow for prediction; they need to express temporal relations
allowing for synchronization and co-occurrence as prerequisites
for social behaviors. Evidence exists, in particular for audio–
visual information, that multimodal action representations are
transferable between sensory modalities and can even be accessed
through senses that were not actively involved in the process
of action acquisition (Rosenblum et al., 2017). Rosenblum
et al. (2017) propose that the architecture of the brain implies
perceptual parity between the senses, and that cross-sensory
integration occurs completely and early in the perceptual stream.
The authors argue in favor of task rather than sensory modality
as primary organizing principle, and suggest that perceptual
learning might involve extracting amodal primitives that are
not specifically tied to sensory modalities, therefore perceptual
learning within the same task context should be transferable
between senses. This argument provides explanatory ground with
regards to the results of the present study in which participants
showed that they were able to exploit movement information
gained through physical execution without visual feedback
for a visual recognition task. In real-world motor learning
tasks in sports and dance, information from other sensory
modalities such as action-related sound contributes significantly
to motor learning (e.g., Camponogara et al., 2017; Sors et al.,
2017). Camponogara et al. (2017) showed that expert basketball
players were able to infer opponents’ movement intentions
from action-based sound more accurately than novices, by
picking up action-specific movement information and using
it to anticipate the opponent’s future position. The authors
suggest that the experts pick up relevant kinematic features such
as velocity, trajectory, and position of deceptive movements
through structural and transformational invariants of the
movement sounds by directly mapping sound characteristics
onto action intentions. These findings are supported by fMRI
results showing that sports experts display specific activation in
brain areas involved in action planning when passively listening
to task-relevant sounds from their own area of expertise, but not
in response to irrelevant sounds (Woods et al., 2014).
With regards to the creating movement task applied in the
current study, it cannot be ruled out that the participants, while
being blindfolded, created mental images of the performed action
using visual imagery. As this is not unlikely, it might have been
interesting to investigate the influence of cognitive strategies
on action recognition, for example by means of a post hoc
questionnaire or interview. In dance, mental imagery is applied
for different purposes including the rehearsal, creation, and
interpretation of movement and the preparation or recreation of
the body (Hanrahan and Vergeer, 2001; Nordin and Cumming,
2007), and dance training has been found to increase the
efficiency of imagery techniques (Golomer et al., 2008; Fink
et al., 2009). Even participants without dance training experience
might have used visual imagery during the experimental task to
compensate for the lack of visual feedback.
The finding that recognition accuracy for observed
movements was below that of movements learnt through
observation and practice supports the notion that action
execution is generally more beneficial for learning than
observation alone (e.g., Badets et al., 2006). In sports and dance
training, the learning of dance-like actions (see Schachner
and Carey, 2013) is most commonly practiced in the form
of observational learning from a visual model, typically
augmented by verbal comments as teacher feedback (Wulf
and Prinz, 2001) and supported by simultaneous movement
execution or marking (Kirsh, 2011; Warburton et al., 2013).
The often-observed superiority of combined motor and visual
learning, compared to visual learning alone, can be explained
with reference to the integration of multisensory information
during action acquisition (Land et al., 2013), by stating that
the participation of more sensory modalities in the learning
process might result in a richer representation that involves
more complementary information and therefore leads to a better
learning outcome. Even though the majority of studies supports
the view that physical execution results in better learning than
mere observation, evidence against such an enactment effect has
also been found, in particular for complex “real-world” type tasks
involving longer action sequences (von Stülpnagel et al., 2016a,b).
Findings by Allerdissen et al. (2017) suggest that it might not
be the mere redundancy of information that enhances learning
success in multimodal conditions, but rather the contribution
of different modalities providing slightly different information
that is then integrated in a meaningful way, and that the
ability to integrate relevant information into a consistent action
representation and omit irrelevant or contradictory information
can be considered a feature of domain-specific expertise. Plenty
of evidence exists that auditory information is more accurate
than vision with regards to temporal action features and that
action control therefore relies more strongly on sound if timing,
speed, or rhythm is crucial (e.g., Repp and Penel, 2002), which
is of particular relevance in sports (Camponogara et al., 2017;
Sors et al., 2017). Studies using audio-based interventions in
sports support the view that auditory information is more
pertinent than visual information with regards to rhythmic
movement features and precisely timed actions (Sors et al.,
2015). A study with tap dancers showed that temporal properties
of rhythmic dance movement can be better perceived through
auditory than visual stimuli (Murgia et al., 2017). In this study,
experts’ accuracy in recognizing dance steps was higher than
non-dancers’ in the auditory domain, and in the auditory than in
the visual domain.
As a second point of interest, we investigated self-recognition
from the point-light displays presented in the recognition task
by asking the participants to identify the actor as self or non-
self. Previous studies had shown that people can easily distinguish
between themselves, familiar persons, and strangers from point-
light displays of different types of actions (e.g., Loula et al.,
2005).
Discrimination between one’s own compared to another’s
motor actions on the basis of action-based auditory information
has been proved successful for different sports (Murgia
et al., 2012; Kennel et al., 2014), and EEG evidence has
supported these findings by reporting activation of an evaluation
network for agent identification through action-related sound
stimuli (Justen et al., 2014). Even though the rhythmic
structure has been identified as relevant factor, self recognition
from action-based sound does not depend on rhythmic
features exclusively, but on a more complex auditory “gestalt”
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(Kennel et al., 2014). Sevdalis and Keller (2009) found that
free dancing resulted in better self-recognition from point-
light displays compared to walking and clapping, and argued
in favor of a more pronounced “kinematic fingerprint” of the
improvised full-body motor action. Loula et al. (2005) also
observed that participants identified themselves and familiar
persons successfully from point-light displays of dancing, boxing,
and playing ping-pong, but failed to reach chance level for
displays of walking and running. Mitchell and Curry (2016),
in contrast, found that participants identified themselves above
chance level from walking point-light walkers presented from
different perspectives. In our study, participants did not identify
themselves correctly above chance level if only the video clips
of self-created and learnt movements are taken into account
(self-identification in clips showing unfamiliar or only observed
movements would not make much sense in the given context).
Only 22 out of 57 clips (38.6%) showing the participant him-
or herself performing a self-created of learnt movement were
identified as “self,” and 20 clips were erroneously identified as
“self.”
Furthermore, we found an interesting interaction between
action and actor recognition: participants were more likely to
identify the actor as “self ” in clips they had assigned to the
category “created” than in clips they had assigned to the category
“learnt.” This effect was much stronger in the situation if the
“self ” judgment was actually true. These results show that self-
recognition and action recognition influenced each other and
that categorization of a movement as “learnt” or “self-created”
had a biasing effect on actor identification, which points toward a
significant role for agency for self-recognition (see Knoblich and
Flach, 2003; Jeannerod and Pacherie, 2004).
Previous studies had shown that actor recognition and action
recognition are not independent from each other in different
conditions, for example that knowing an actor’s identity and
intention can influence action perception (e.g., Knoblich and
Sebanz, 2006; Sebanz et al., 2006). Ferstl et al. (2017) suggest
that neural mechanisms might exist that link actor information
to action information by encoding actor identity on the basis
of specific cues (facial features, clothing, posture) in service of
action prediction. They claim that action recognition should be
sensitive to actor identity for reasons of ecological validity, as
information about the actor is fundamental for understanding
observed actions. Schütz-Bosbach et al. (2006) showed that
observing others’ actions facilitated the motor system, whereas
observing one’s own actions rather suppressed motor activation.
Based on their results, the authors argued strongly against
agent-neutral action representations, suggesting that neural
mechanisms underlying action observation are intrinsically
social. These studies support the view that action recognition is
influenced by actor recognition, however, in the present study, it
could be claimed that we found a reverse effect, namely that actor
recognition is influenced by action recognition. In this regard,
the order in which participants were asked to identify action and
actor the recognition task might be relevant. For each presented
video clip, the participant had to answer two questions within
the same trial, before the next clip was shown; in each trial,
action recognition (or action categorization) came before actor
recognition (or action identification). This way, participants were
judging the presented movement first on its own merit, however,
it cannot be excluded that the action recognition thereby had a
priming effect on actor recognition, which might have caused
or enhanced the observed interaction bias. First identifying a
presented movement as self-created might have influenced the
“self or other” decision by shifting it toward “self,” which is
reflected by the results. It would be interesting to know if the same
interaction had been found if the questions had been asked in the
opposite order (self-identification before action categorization),
or if the two questions had been asked separately in different
blocks.
Another limitation of the presented experiment might be seen
in the choice of participants. This study was conducted with 19
sports students whose dance experience differed (seven practiced
dance or gymnastics regularly, whereas the others practiced other
types of sports). Even though none of the participants reached
professional level in dance, their different experience might
have affected their individual approach to learning and creating
movement (however, none of the movement phrases created in
the first session was particularly complex or too difficult to be
picked up easily by dance novices). Repeating the experiment
with more homogeneous expertise-based groups (professional
dancers vs. non-dancers) could provide relevant novel insights
regarding these aspects.
CONCLUSION
The results of the presented study support findings of a direct
influence of motor experience on visual action perception and
recognition for actions that have been learnt without visual
feedback. They extend previous results (Casile and Giese, 2006),
to dance-like actions that have been acquired exclusively through
movement exploration and practice, in the absence of vision
and without haptic or verbal feedback. The “blind” execution
and creation of full-body actions (as it is typically applied in
contemporary dance training) obviously results in a multimodal
representation that can be accessed via visual cues, despite the
lack of visual experience. Furthermore, the results corroborate
that agency plays a significant role for self-identification, which
adds new aspects to perspectives taken in social cognition
contexts (Ferstl et al., 2017).
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